Documents › f0e56d92560ff7aa0d5c7a58497aad2f16fccab6:1-15

Robert Handy Expert Report regarding LAPD Shooting involving Officers Zavala and Quintanilla

POST board investigation reportagency investigation 2026-02-12 15 pages (file pages 1–15) original file
About this document
Layer
attachment: a document a meeting packet links to
Type as titled
sme report (kind from doc_type)
File
f0e56d92560ff7aa0d5c7a58497aad2f16fccab6 application/pdf
Cases
POST 2311370 · Jose Zavala (filed under case)
POST 2311373 · Julio Quintanilla (filed under case)

About: Jose Zavala (case), Julio Quintanilla (case)

Page 14 · file page 14 larger image
Image of page 14; its text is alongside
Text: OCR

Expert Report: Robert Handy
LAPD OIS on 12-18-2021
Involving Officers Zavala and Quintanilla

Based on the material reviewed, Victim's turn toward Officer Zavala initiated the lethal response by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. However, Victim, upon turning and facing officers Zavala and Quintanilla, did not pose an imminent threat to them. The situation had not changed dramatically; the four steps Victim took were more toward Officers O-1 and Meraz than toward Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. The lethal force was deployed before any assessment of the 40mm round ordered by Sergeant.

Based on my extensive experience in policing and review of the videos, statements, and other materials available, it is my opinion, the lethal force used against Victim was not in response to an imminent threat as required by the California Penal Code.

Conclusion

Police officers responding to a suicidal man who was also reported to have chased people with a knife can be a dangerous and complicated situation. The objective of modern training for police officers responding to these incidents is to provide tools and techniques that minimize the danger to the subject, citizens, and officers. Those tools include many of the things employed in this situation by the Los Angeles Police Department and the officers involved (small team tactics, less lethal tools – 40mm, bean bag shotguns, and TASERS, ballistic door panels, CIT-type negotiation techniques, and more).

From Sergeant's arrival through the ensuing eight-plus minutes leading up to the shooting, Sergeant and the officers were employing many of the techniques and tools designed to minimize the level of danger to all the parties involved38. The group of officers had a modest level of containment and many options in place if Victim were to become violent toward others. The officers had a variety of less-lethal options (OC Spray, Batons, TASERS, 40mm, Beanbag Shotgun) and were properly using other tools available (ballistic door panels, PA System, hand-held shield).

The group of officers was working through the situation under the direction of Sergeant, who had clearly defined officer roles and responsibilities and was controlling the police response. It did not appear that Victim's movements were significant enough for Officers Zavala and Quintanilla to respond with lethal force when Sergeant had ordered less lethal force to be deployed. In addition, due to the lethal force being fired so close (less than one second) to the less lethal force, there was no opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the less lethal force ordered by Sergeant.


38 Sergeant BWC 4:18 – 13:09

14

Keys: ← → or j k turn pages; / finds.