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Ms. Christine Ford
Bureau Chief, Peace Officer Standards Accountability Division
CA Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
860 Stillwater Road, Suite 100
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Sent Via Email

February 12, 2026

Regarding: Los Angeles Police Department Shooting involving Officers Zavala and Quintanilla on December 18, 2021.

Dear Ms. Ford,

The following report contains my opinions from a review of the Los Angeles Police Department shooting case involving Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. I have studied the reports, documents, and videos listed below. This report presents my expert opinions based on the materials reviewed, my training and education, and more than three decades of law enforcement experience. If additional materials are provided, a supplemental report that adds to or refines my opinions may be necessary.

Expertise

I currently serve as the Director of Public Safety for Grand Canyon University (GCU) in Phoenix, Arizona. Before serving as the Director of Public Safety at GCU, I was the police chief in Huntington Beach and San Bernardino, California. I am a policing executive with over 35 years of comprehensive law enforcement experience. My experience includes extensive experience training and teaching new police officers, veteran officers, and command-level officers.

In addition to reviewing thousands of use-of-force cases and hundreds of police shooting cases in my policing career, I have also been retained as a subject matter expert to review police use-of-force incidents and policing practices and procedures nationwide. Attached is my curriculum vitae for a more detailed description of my related experience.

Brief Incident Summary

On December 18, 2021, at approximately 1710 hours, Los Angeles police officers responded to a call of a suicidal man with a knife call. Witnesses had reported Victim walking on the street, waiving a knife in the air and frightening families[1]. When the officers arrived, they found Victim armed with a large meat cleaver-style knife on the front porch of a residential building. The officers attempted to get Victim to drop the knife for more than eight minutes before the incident ended in an officer-involved shooting, where Victim was shot and killed[2].

Expert Opinions and Basis for Opinions

My expert opinions in this case are listed below, with the prominent opinions numbered and in bold type. The basis for the opinions follows the opinions and includes sub-opinions regarding the encounter between the suspect and the officers. The opinions expressed are based on my review of the materials listed, the citations listed throughout the report, my extensive law enforcement training, and more than three decades of policing and academic experiences in policing.

1. **The officers' attempts to contact and detain Victim were appropriate and consistent with training, practices, and the standards for police officers in California and across the country.**

2. **The officers' display of their firearms and threatened use of lethal force on Victim as they attempted to detain him was consistent with training, practices, and the standards for police officers in California and across the country.**

Basis For Opinion

A series of court decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution governs an officer's authority to contact, detain, and arrest individuals. Officers are taught laws of arrest based on these decisions, starting with reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain a person, probable cause to arrest an individual, and the authority to use force to detain or arrest a person. Peace officers may need to detain a person to investigate involvement in criminal activity. To be lawful, a

[1] FID Report, Page 3
[2] Zavala and Quintanilla BWC

detention must be based on reasonable suspicion that unlawful activity has occurred, is taking place, or is about to occur, and that the person detained is connected to that activity[3].

In this instance, the officers were responding to radio calls of a subject threatening suicide with a knife. They also received information that Victim was chasing people down the street with a knife. Sergeant was first to arrive, followed by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. When Sergeant arrived, he observed Victim sitting on the exterior stairs of the apartment building holding a knife in his right hand. Victim was holding the blade of the knife pressed up against his neck.

At this point, the officers had information that Victim was suicidal and that he had chased people down the street with the knife. When they arrived, they confirmed that Victim was armed with a large, meat cleaver-style knife. The response from Sergeant, Officer Zavala, and Officer Quintanilla when they arrived and exited their cars was to draw their weapons and give Victim orders to drop the knife. The officers had parked their police vehicles perpendicular to the apartment building and were using their vehicle doors as partial cover and concealment while giving commands to Victim[4]. The presence of the marked vehicles, officers in uniform, and the orders given to Victim constituted an attempt to detain Victim and prevent harm to himself or others and further investigate the reports of assaults with the knife before the officers' arrival. Based on the totality of the circumstances, the attempt to detain Victim using officer presence, verbal commands, and the display of firearms was appropriate and consistent with police officer training, standards, and practices in California and across the United States.

3. The use of 40 mm less lethal munitions to get Victim to drop the knife and comply with orders from the officers was appropriate and consistent with training, practices, and the standards for police officers in California and across the country.

Basis for Opinion

Sergeant, along with Officers Zavala and Quintanilla, were engaging with Victim when additional officers arrived. As officers arrived, Sergeant assigned them to positions (specific angles of coverage) and to specific responsibilities, such as serving as less-lethal or cover officers. Officer 1 ended up with a less lethal assignment, positioning himself with a 40 mm less lethal launcher pointed at Victim. Sergeant assigned officers Zavala and Quintanilla lethal coverage. Officers Officer 2 and Officer 3 were assigned as an arrest team. The air unit arrived, and the pilot and tactical flight officer directed responding units to perimeter and crowd control positions.

[3] CA POST Learning Domain 15, Chapter 3
[4] FID Report, BWC, Zavala, Quintanilla, Sergeant

Several officers were giving Victim commands in English and Spanish throughout the encounter. The officers yelled commands and intermittently used the public address system on Sergeant [redacted]'s police vehicle. The commands were clearly and calmly delivered and varied throughout the more than eight minutes of attempting to persuade Victim to drop the knife. The commands incorporated techniques designed to be persuasive, such as using Victim's first name and offering him services[5].

At approximately 1704 hours into the contact with Victim, at the direction of Sergeant, Officer 1 fired a 40 mm round, striking Victim in the abdominal area. Sergeant ordered the 40 mm deployed because he was concerned Victim would flee and start attacking civilians. Sergeant was hopeful the 40 mm would cause Victim to drop the knife and surrender. The round did not initially appear to have any effect. Victim brushed off the sponge round with a swipe of his hand and did not drop the knife or make any move to surrender. Victim did sit back down on the bottom step shortly after being struck with the 40 mm. Sergeant did not give a specific warning to Victim before ordering the 40 mm round to be fired because he thought the situation was too dangerous and that Victim might run if he were warned. However, Sergeant did announce "Forty stand-by" out loud to the group of officers so that there would not be any confusion with lethal rounds being fired[6].

Officer 1 fired a second 40 mm less lethal round at approximately 1710 hours. Prior to the round being fired, Sergeant again announced, "Forty stand-by." Less than one second after the 40 mm was fired, lethal rounds were also fired by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla[7].

The 40 mm less-lethal round is a sponge-like projectile 40 mm in diameter. The round is fired from a launcher specifically designed to deploy 40 mm projectiles. Officers are trained to utilize devices such as a 40 mm less lethal round when confronting a person who is "aggressive, or combative; attempting to assault the officer, another person, verbally, or displays an intention to assault another person[8]."

Provided that Victim was armed with a knife, threatening suicide, and refusing commands for several minutes to drop the knife, the 40 mm was an appropriate option whose application under the circumstances was consistent with police officer training and standards in California and across the United States.

4. **Given the totality of circumstances, the lethal force used by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla in this incident was not consistent with the requirements for use of deadly force in the California Penal Code, nor police officer training and standards in California.**

[5] FID Report pages 1- 14
[6] FID Report pages 9-11
[7] FID Report pages 9-11
[8] California PST Learning Domain 20, Chapter 3

Basis for Opinion

Police officers are taught the legal authority and considerations for using deadly force. The legal authority and standards for lethal force are based on an objective reasonableness standard based on the Constitution's Fourth Amendment, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. Officers are taught that they may use deadly force when it reasonably appears necessary to stop an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury based on the totality of the circumstances presented to them at the time. The force they use must be objectively reasonable compared to the threat, resistance, and other circumstances perceived by or known to the officer when the force was used[9].

The California Penal Code further instructs officers on the definition of an imminent threat, which is required for a peace officer to use deadly force in California.

> "A threat of death or serious bodily injury is 'imminent' when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed[10]."

In this instance, Sergeant, and Officers Zavala, Quintanilla, O-1, O-2, Meraz, Officer 4, and Officer 3 were in the immediate area and involved in the contact with Victim. Initial contact with Victim was made when Sergeant arrived, followed shortly by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. The other officers arrived shortly thereafter as the incident continued. Sergeant supervised the scene and issued orders assigning specific tasks to the officers. Sergeant's initial organization of the officers and division of specific responsibilities was consistent with contemporary training and standards for handling such incidents.

Officers Zavala and Quintanilla were assigned as lethal coverage officers by Sergeant, meaning they were to have their firearms out and pointed at the suspect in case an imminent deadly threat was presented. Officer 1 and Officer 4 maintained positions with less lethal tools, Officer 1 with a 40mm and Officer 4 with a beanbag shotgun. Officer Meraz was assigned as lethal coverage and positioned himself next to Officer 1[11].

At approximately 1704 hours, Sergeant decided to have Officer 1 fire the 40 mm projectile as described in the previous section. The first attempted use of the 40 mm struck Victim in the abdomen but had little effect; it did appear to get Victim to sit down again, this time on the bottom step of the apartment building[12].


[9] CA POST Learning Domain 20, Chapter 3, 4
[10] CA Penal Code 835(a)(e)(2)
[11] FID Report
[12] Quintanilla BWC 3:35-3:42

After the first 40 mm deployment, Sergeant continued to refine the officers' containment positions as additional resources arrived. Officer 4 was moved with a less lethal (beanbag shotgun) to the west near where Officers Zavala and Quintanilla were positioned[13]. The team had established lethal and less lethal coverage to the north and slightly east, and the same to the north and slightly west of the subject, Victim. The LAPD air unit also arrived overhead and began to callout positions for traffic control

As Sergeant negotiated with Victim (over the patrol vehicle PA system), Victim stood up abruptly, knocked his hat off, and took four steps north, in the general direction of Officer 1 (less lethal, 40mm) and Officer Meraz (lethal, shotgun). Sergeant ordered another deployment of a 40 mm less lethal round at approximately 1710 hours[14].

Various BWC videos show Victim standing up, holding the knife at head level, and taking four steps toward the officers. Sergeant yelled out, "Forty forty up," and Officer 1 deployed the 40 mm one-time, striking Victim on the right side of his torso. Officer 1 fired the second 40 mm round at approximately 1710 hours. The Officer 1's position is depicted below in the diagram taken from the FID report, labeled as Figure #1[15].

Figure #1




The red line in Figure #1 indicates the approximate positioning of Officer 1 on one end and the approximate position of Victim on the other end. Officer 1 was in the opening of the police vehicle's doorway, and Victim was on the sidewalk. The diagram depicts the approximate positions of Victim and Officer 1 when Officer 1 fired the 40 mm projectile (the second round at approximately. 1710). The second deployment of the 40 mm was ordered based on Sergeant 's concerns about Victim standing up and knocking his hat off, and that Victim was going to get up and run toward a witness[16].

[13] Sergeant BWC 9:52
[14] FID Report
[15] The diagrams and referenced measurements related to Figures #1, #2, and #4 along with the timing of the gunshots are all taken from the FID report, pages 15-21
[16] FID Report page, 12-16

As Officer 1 was firing the 40mm, Victim started turning his body to his left, toward Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. Near simultaneously with the firing of the 40mm, Victim turned his body to face west, and Officer Zavala fired his handgun three times. Officer Quintanilla fired his handgun one-time at Victim. The positioning, timing, reasons, and analysis for each officer firing their handguns are detailed below.

Officer Zavala fired three rounds from his handgun, starting .382 seconds after Officer 1 fired the 40 mm round. Officer Zavala was positioned at the driver's door opening of the patrol vehicle, as depicted in the diagram labeled Figure #2.

Figure #2



The red line in Figure #2 indicates the approximate positioning of Officer Zavala on one end and the approximate position of Victim on the other end. Officer Zavala is in the opening of the police vehicle's driver's side doorway, and Victim is on the sidewalk. The diagram depicts the approximate positioning of Victim and Officer Zavala when Officer Zavala fired three rounds from his handgun. The distance between Officer Zavala and Victim was approximately 25 feet.

Figure #3 is a screenshot from Officer Zavala's body-worn camera (BWC) recording of the approximate time Officer Zavala fired the first round from his handgun. The second and third rounds followed in rapid succession. From the BWC video of Officer Zavala, it appears his camera was mounted in the center of his chest, providing a view from that perspective.

Figure #3[17]



Officer Zavala's reasons for using deadly force by firing his weapon are summarized below in his words to the FID investigators.


> *"The suspect gets up very rapidly with the -- with the large butcher knife in his right hand. He takes a deep breath, like getting courage, looks at me, looks at my fellow officers. At this point I already had my firearm out. Due to the tactical situation, I had reason to believe that the situation may escalate to the point where deadly force may be justified. The suspect then starts advancing towards the officers and turns his body towards myself and my partner. And in fear --I was afraid, sir. I thought this guy was going to come at me with this butcher knife. He already cut his hand. He cut his throat -- he attempted to cut his throat. He chased pedestrians and civilians around the neighborhood with this large butcher knife. And to protect myself and any partner's life and the citizens nearby from serious bodily injury, imminent threat, I fired approximately two, three rounds to stop the threat, sir."*
>
> *"So when I fired two, three shots, that's when I assess. He was already on the ground. So at the time I fired, there was the steps behind and there was that lobby in the back. So -- so it was just the steps and the lobby in the back, sir, and it was clear. Nobody was back there*[18]*.*
>
> "So the second time he rapidly got up, sir, holding the knife in front of Him. He took approximately five, six steps towards the office -- towards the officers and myself, sir, turning his torso towards me in a threatening manner and that's when we fired to stop the threat, sir[19].

[17] Screenshot from Officer Zavala's BWC recording
[18] FID Report pages 18-19, Zavala interview transcript, pages 12-13
[19] Zavala interview transcript, page 26

> "Oh, sir, I was afraid that the suspect was going to stab me, sir. I was afraid of my life. I was afraid of my partner's life and the other officers that were to the left of me. Not only that, sir, I was afraid of the pedestrians that were nearby. He already had chased several pedestrians, based on the comments of the call, with this large butcher knife. His demeanor, his cutting his hand, attempting to cut his throat, standing up, took a deep breath, tensed up, and boom, took these five, six steps towards us. I was afraid of my life, sir[20].
>
> "Yes, sir. Approximately -- I would say 10, 15, maybe 20 feet, sir. You know, maybe 10, 15 I would say, yeah[21]."
>
> "And even more resources where we were at too, sir, right? And maybe have more officers there. Have another officer with a Taser ready. You know, we needed resources there and we didn't have resources[22]."

Officer Quintanilla fired one round, approximately .322 seconds after Officer Zavala's third shot. Officer Quintanilla was positioned at the opening of the patrol vehicle's passenger door, as depicted in the diagram labeled Figure #4.

Figure #4



The red line in Figure #4 indicates the approximate positioning of Officer Quintanilla on one end and the approximate position of Victim on the other end. Officer Quintanilla is in the opening of the police vehicle's passenger side doorway, and Victim is on the sidewalk. The diagram depicts the approximate positioning of Victim and Officer Quintanilla when Officer Quintanilla fired one

[20] Zavala interview transcript, pages 26-27
[21] Zavala interview transcript, pages 43-44
[22] Zavala interview transcript, page 44

round from his handgun. The distance between Officer Quintanilla and Victim was approximately 28 feet[23].

Figure #5[24]



Officer Quintanilla's reasons for using deadly force by firing his weapon are summarized in quotes to the FID investigators below.

> *"When he came down, we kept giving him commands and once he hit the sidewalk, I mean, I was scared and he ended up walking towards us -- towards the officers and myself and that's when I -- I had to use deadly force[25].*
>
> *"I had to stop the threat. He was coming towards us. He was going to cause myself or my partner serious bodily injury. He was going to cause death. And also, there was still civilians just to the right of me, just a few feet away from me. So he could have caused serious bodily injury or death to them if I didn't do that. I had to do it[26]."*
>
> *"So the background to where the suspect was and where I was pointing my firearm, there's an apartment building that was behind him. However, the apartment building is elevated. There's a stairway where he comes down from, which is below where the apartment is…And when he went down, I stopped shooting. I stopped.[27]"*

[23] The diagrams and referenced measurements related to Figures #1, #2, and #4 along with the timing of the gunshots are all taken from the FID report, pages 15-21
[24] Screenshot from Officer Quintanilla's BWC recording
[25] FAID Report page 19
[26] FAID Report page 19
[27] FAID Report page 19

> *"So I'm using the vehicle as cover and I'm standing behind my ballistic door and I'm trying to -- I'm trying to just use my vehicle as cover as best I can, not giving him ground[28].*
>
> *"I want to say about 15 feet[29]."*
>
> *"Once he comes down the sidewalk, he faces towards my partner and I direction and he advances at us. He makes an advance motion at us and I deploy my firearm[30]."*
>
> *"I deployed it because I had -- you know, it was -- I had to use – I had to stop him. I had to stop the threat. He was coming towards us. He was going to cause myself or my partner serious bodily injury. He was going to cause death. And also there was still civilians just to the right of me, just a few feet away from me. So he could have caused serious bodily injury or death to them if I didn't do that. I had to do it[31].*
>
> *"I see this gentleman that's -- that's trying to come eastbound towards – towards where the suspect is and between -- pretty much between us -- the officers and the suspect. And obviously I didn't want that to happen. I didn't want him to get hurt. I see an officer in his vehicle, and I tell him -- you know, because he's not getting out the car and telling him to leave. So I scream at him and I tell him, "Hey, get out the car and address this citizen and tell him to get out the way or leave the area," I believe, I told him. But I did scream that to the officer[32]."*

When Officers Zavala and Quintanilla arrived, Sergeant was already on scene. Sergeant assigned them to be lethal coverage and essentially containment on the west side of the subject, Victim. Officer 4 was moved over to assist on the west side with a less lethal beanbag shotgun, and another officer was moved over with a police vehicle on the west side to control pedestrian traffic and provide containment to the west[33].

When Victim got up and started moving the first time with the knife, the 40 mm was ordered deployed by Sergeant . Victim was moving down the stairs when the 40 mm struck him, but it seemed to have little impact based on his reaction. However, Victim stopped moving farther away from the steps and sat down on the bottom step of the building.

When Victim got up to move a second time, more than six minutes after the first 40 mm, Sergeant again yelled for the 40 mm to be deployed. Victim appeared to move four steps toward officers O-1 and Meraz. Officer 1 deployed the 40mm as Victim turned toward the

[28] Quintanilla Interview with Investigators, page 24
[29] Quintanilla Interview with Investigators, page 25
[30] Quintanilla Interview with Investigators, page 29
[31] Quintanilla Interview with Investigators, page 30
[32] Quintanilla Interview with Investigators, page 37
[33] Sergeant BWC footage

west, facing Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. Officer Zavala fired first, three times, then Officer Quintanilla fired one time[34].

At the time the shots were fired, the officers were each standing behind vehicle doors equipped with ballistic protection panels. Officer Zavala was approximately 25 feet away from Victim, and Officer Quintanilla was approximately 28 feet away from Victim. Both officers indicated that they fired because they thought Victim was going to cause serious bodily injury or death. For example, Officer Zavala told investigators, "The suspect then starts advancing towards the officers and turns his body towards myself and my partner. And in fear --I was afraid, sir. I thought this guy was going to come at me with this butcher knife." Officer Quintanilla told investigators, "He was coming towards us. He was going to cause myself or my partner serious bodily injury. He was going to cause death."

While the officers' reasons for firing their weapons are reasonable fears of what could happen, they are speculative and do not amount to imminent harm as defined by the California Penal Code. Factors indicating Victim was not an imminent threat include:

- Victim, at the time he was shot, was standing, facing officers Zavala and Quintanilla, not advancing on them
- Less lethal tools were in place in two directions, including next to Officer Zavala (Officer 4 with a beanbag)[35]
- Both officers were standing behind the police vehicle doors with ballistic panels more than 28 feet away from Victim
- Sergeant ordered the less-lethal rounds to be fired moments before the officers fired their handguns
- A 40 mm less lethal round was fired a second time, less than one second before Officer Zavala fired from his handgun. There was no opportunity to see if the less lethal, ordered by the sergeant, was effective
- There were multiple officers and options available to try and stop Victim had he advanced toward Officers Zavala and Quintanilla
- There were officers closer to Victim than Officer Zavala and Quintanilla, who did not fire their handguns. Officers O-1 and Meraz were approximately 22 feet away from Victim when Officer Zavala first fired[36]. Officer 1 fired the 40 mm as directed, less than one second before Officer Zavala fired his handgun. Officer Meraz, who was providing lethal

[34] Zavala, Quintanilla, Sergeant BWC video, FID Report
[35] FID Report page, 14
[36] FID Report page, 16

coverage next to Officer 1, did not fire

- Less lethal was available immediately next to Officer Zavala (Officer 4 with a stun bag shotgun), but was not utilized.

- The organization of this small team of officers was designed to provide less-lethal options for each grouping of officers. Victim's initial movement (4 steps) just before being shot was toward Officers O-1 and Meraz; thus, the 40 mm (Officer 1) was ordered deployed by Sergeant and fired by Officer 1.

- There were at least eight officers present and organized to deal with any of the possible scenarios that Officers Zavala and Quintanilla stated they feared, and as reasons they shot Victim

- Based on the totality of the circumstances, Victim's turning toward Officers Zavala and Quintanilla does not constitute an imminent threat as defined in California law.

> "A threat of death or serious bodily injury is 'imminent' when, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer in the same situation would believe that a person has the present ability, opportunity, and apparent intent to immediately cause death or serious bodily injury to the peace officer or another person. An imminent harm is not merely a fear of future harm, no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the likelihood of the harm, but is one that, from appearances, must be instantly confronted and addressed[37]."

Throughout the videos and all the materials available, I did not see, hear, or review any documented direct threats toward the officers or any other person. Victim was suicidal, a threat to himself, and posed many potential threatening scenarios based on possible actions. When Victim stood up and stepped toward the officers, the situation was changing. The officers were set up to prevent Victim's movement and to address potential threatening scenarios under the direction of Sergeant . Sergeant ordered the second 40mm less lethal deployment. When the 40mm round was ordered, Victim had started moving forward in the direction of Officers O-1 and Meraz.

By the time the 40mm was deployed, Victim was no longer moving forward toward Officers O-1 and Meraz; he was turning his body and feet toward Officers Zavala, Quintanilla, and Officer 4. When Victim was stepping toward Officer 1 and turning toward Officer Zavala, the movements were not hurried. He was not running, lunging, or aggressively advancing toward the officers. Victim's turn toward Officer Zavala was also at normal speed and did not appear to be a sudden or aggressive move.

[37] CA Penal Code 835(a)(e)(2)

Based on the material reviewed, Victim's turn toward Officer Zavala initiated the lethal response by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. However, Victim, upon turning and facing officers Zavala and Quintanilla, did not pose an imminent threat to them. The situation had not changed dramatically; the four steps Victim took were more toward Officers O-1 and Meraz than toward Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. The lethal force was deployed before any assessment of the 40mm round ordered by Sergeant.

Based on my extensive experience in policing and review of the videos, statements, and other materials available, it is my opinion, the lethal force used against Victim was not in response to an imminent threat as required by the California Penal Code.

Conclusion

Police officers responding to a suicidal man who was also reported to have chased people with a knife can be a dangerous and complicated situation. The objective of modern training for police officers responding to these incidents is to provide tools and techniques that minimize the danger to the subject, citizens, and officers. Those tools include many of the things employed in this situation by the Los Angeles Police Department and the officers involved (small team tactics, less lethal tools – 40mm, bean bag shotguns, and TASERS, ballistic door panels, CIT-type negotiation techniques, and more).

From Sergeant's arrival through the ensuing eight-plus minutes leading up to the shooting, Sergeant and the officers were employing many of the techniques and tools designed to minimize the level of danger to all the parties involved[38]. The group of officers had a modest level of containment and many options in place if Victim were to become violent toward others. The officers had a variety of less-lethal options (OC Spray, Batons, TASERs, 40mm, Beanbag Shotgun) and were properly using other tools available (ballistic door panels, PA System, hand-held shield).

The group of officers was working through the situation under the direction of Sergeant, who had clearly defined officer roles and responsibilities and was controlling the police response. It did not appear that Victim's movements were significant enough for Officers Zavala and Quintanilla to respond with lethal force when Sergeant had ordered less lethal force to be deployed. In addition, due to the lethal force being fired so close (less than one second) to the less lethal force, there was no opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the less lethal force ordered by Sergeant.

[38] Sergeant BWC 4:18 – 13:09

The use of lethal force by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla appeared to be inconsistent with the tactics being directed by Sergeant in this incident. Victim's turn in direction, toward the two officers, did not significantly change the circumstances to warrant a lethal response. The use of deadly force did not appear to be in response to an imminent threat as defined by the California Penal Code.

Respectfully Submitted,

Robert Handy
Peoria, Arizona

Documents Reviewed

I have examined the following reports, documents, audio recordings, photos, and other evidence listed to render my opinions:

Number	File
1	BWC footage Officer Zavala
2	BWC footage Officer Quintanilla
3	BWC Footage Sergeant
4	FID Report F064-21
5	Chief of Police (COP) Interdepartmental Report
6	Letter of Transmission (LOT 22-003757)
7	Letter of Transmission (LOT 22-003418)
8	Quintanilla Discipline Notice
9	Zavala Discipline Notice
10	Federal civil complaint
11	Quintanilla EDI profile
12	Quintanilla LADP image
13	Zavala EDI profile
14	Zavala LAPD image
15	Zavala interview transcript
16	Quintanilla interview transcript
17	LAPD edge weapon policy
18	Graham v Connor, 490 U.S. Supreme Court 386 (1989)
19	California Penal Code 835
29	California POST Learning Domains 15, 20