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736 - BR05_POST2311370_Zavala Jose_Attachment D - COP IntradeptMemo_Redacted.pdf

POST board correspondencecorrespondence and logs 2026-04-15 28 pages (file pages 304–331) original file
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POST 2311370 · Jose Zavala (packet item)

About: Jose Zavala (case)

Page 13 · file page 316 larger image
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The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners

Page 13

3.2

Regarding Sergeant's decision to forgo the use of force warning, the Majority noted that per Tactics Directive No. 17.1, a use of force warning is not required if a tactical plan requires the element of surprise to stabilize a situation. While the Majority would have preferred that Sergeant had ensured a warning was provided before directing Officer 1 to discharge the 40mm LLL, they understood he intended to use the element of surprise to prevent Victim from running toward and potentially harming others. Additionally, based on his transcribed statement, the Majority opined there was no conflict in Sergeant's explanation for forgoing the use of force warning and that his statement regarding time being on his side pertained to not prematurely approaching Victim.

Sergeant recalled,

DETECTIVE GOLAN: And I think we can hear it in your body-worn video, but did you provide or did anybody else provide a warning prior to use of force?

Sergeant I believe I said, "40 stand by. 40 stand by," to our officers. I don't know. I don't know if I gave him a warning. I don't believe I did. At that point I believe the situation was -- it was too dangerous with that. I didn't want to -- I didn't want to give him that warning to let him know that we were going to hit him, because that might have had him take off running. So I didn't want -- I didn't want to do that. But I did notify our guys that we were going to fire the 40.16

In reviewing this case, I noted that Sergeant elected to perform several tasks he should have assigned to the officers at the scene, specifically communicating with Victim and retrieving the ballistic shield. As stated above, command and control is the use of active leadership to direct others while using available resources to coordinate a response, accomplish tasks and minimize risk. During an incident of this nature, a critical component of command and control is the delegation of duties. If a supervisor feels an officer is having difficulty performing a specific task, he or she should rotate another officer in, not assume the task themselves. While I commend Sergeant for his initiative, I would have preferred he had delegated more of the tasks that he chose to perform. Had he done so, he would have been afforded the ability to focus solely on maintaining supervisory oversight.

For these reasons, I find that the tactics employed by Sergeant were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department-approved tactical training. To enhance future performance, I will direct this to be a topic of discussion during the tactical debrief.

Tactical Debrief

In conducting an objective assessment of this case, the UOFRB Minority determined, and I concur, that Sergeant's actions were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department-approved tactical training. The UOFRB also determined, and I concur, that the actions of Officers Zavala, Quintanilla, and O-1 were not a deviation from Department-approved tactical training.


16 Sergeant's transcript, Page 30, Lines 7-19.

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