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702 - BR09_POST2403212_Adams Richard_Attach H-SPB Resolution and Order-Proposed Decision_Redacted.pdf

POST board commission decisionboard proceeding 2026-03-05 26 pages (file pages 299–324) original file
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POST 2403212 · Richard Adams (packet item)

About: Richard Adams (case)

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Richard Adams
Case No. 24-1576
Page 17 of 24

evidence is “evidence that has more convincing force than that opposed to it.” (Glage v. Hawes Firearms Co. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 314, 324.)

In determining whether there is a preponderance of evidence, the trier of fact may consider direct and circumstantial evidence, and consider reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. (Leslie G. v. Perry & Associates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 472, 483.) An inference is a “deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be drawn from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established” at hearing. (Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b).) An inference must logically flow from other facts established in the proceeding. (See, e.g., Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.4th 394, 417.) A trier of fact cannot draw an inference based merely on suspicion, guesswork, or conjecture. (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.)

Appellant’s Affirmative Defense

The USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees because of their service in the United States military. (38 U.S.C.A. § 4311.) Appellant identified retaliation in violation of the USERRA as an affirmative defense in his Prehearing and Settlement Conference Statement, and his counsel referred to that affirmative defense in response to a relevance objection. In closing argument, however, Appellant’s counsel did not further elaborate on the defense or identify any specific statute. It appears that Appellant intended to claim that CHP retaliated against him in violation of 38 U.S.C.A. section 4311. To the extent that Appellant intended to assert that any statute other than 38 U.S.C.A. section 4311 applied, that argument is waived. (See, e.g., Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) It is not a tribunal’s role to develop the parties’ arguments for them. (Ibid.)

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