Brentwood Police Department Notice of Intent to Terminate - Paul Matejcek
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- attachment: a document a meeting packet links to
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- notice of intent to terminate (kind from doc_type)
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- 094632cf685554862c554bc61270829f38e83e66 application/pdf
- Cases
About: Paul Matejcek (case)
(r) Prior contacts with the subject or awareness of any propensity for violence.
(s) Any other exigent circumstances.
B. FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE CHARGES1
You violated the above referenced policies, rules, and/or codes during the incident documented below:
On April 23, 2022, at approximately 5:30 a.m., you and two other Department officers, Officers David Franson and Josh Flynn, responded to a call of a person screaming from a line of garden sheds for sale in the parking lot of the Home Depot on Lone Tree Way. You discovered a local unhoused person, [V1] [V1] hiding in one of the sheds. You handcuffed, detained, and sat [V1] on the ground pending further investigation. Approximately eight minutes after she was detained, [V1] stood up while she remained handcuffed. At that point, you took about three quick steps toward [V1] and with your right foot, kicked [V1] in her torso area, knocking her backwards into the open shed before she fell back to the ground. You arrested [V1] for Battery on a Police Officer (Penal Code section 243 (b)) and Public Intoxication (Penal Code section 647(f)).
You then wrote your report in a manner that attempts to minimize the violent force with which you kicked [V1]. You stated in convoluted fashion that you “utilized my right leg to force her off balance and back onto the ground with as less intrusive force as possible”; “kicked my right foot forward planting the ball of my foot against [V1] left side . . . and extended my leg”; and, “chose to use my foot to push [V1] off balance.”
C. ANALYSIS
In determining that penalty which is appropriate in this matter, I am guided by Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 218-219, in which the State Supreme Court said:
the overriding consideration in these cases is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated, is likely to result in harm to the public service . . . . Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.
Applying this standard, I believe that your conduct warrants termination of your employment. (See, e.g., Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755.)’
As a preliminary matter, I note the justice system holds law enforcement professionals to the highest standards of conduct given the trust and power afforded to them. (See, e.g., Titus v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 357, 364; Ackerman v.
1 I am aware that the District Attorney is evaluating your conduct to determine whether to file criminal charges. If the District Attorney does not file criminal charges, that will not affect my proposal since the District Attorney evaluates whether to file criminal charges using a different standard. If the D.A. does file charges, then dismisses them or you are acquitted, that similarly will not affect my proposal. However, if you are charged and convicted, that may be an independent basis for new disciplinary charges.
Keys: ← → or j k turn pages; / finds.