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737 - BR11_POST2311373_Quintanilla Julio_Attachment J - SME Report_Redacted.pdf

POST board investigation reportagency investigation 2026-04-15 15 pages (file pages 696–710) original file
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Cases
POST 2311373 · Julio Quintanilla (packet item)

About: Julio Quintanilla (case)

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Expert Report: Robert Handy 
LAPD OIS on 12-18-2021 
Involving Officers Zavala and Quintanilla  
 
14 
Based on the material reviewed, 
’s turn toward Officer Zavala initiated the lethal response 
by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. However, 
, upon turning and facing officers Zavala and 
Quintanilla, did not pose an imminent threat to them.  The situation had not changed 
dramatically; the four steps 
 took were more toward Officers 
 and Meraz than toward 
Officers Zavala and Quintanilla.  The lethal force was deployed before any assessment of the 
40mm round ordered by 
.   
 
Based on my extensive experience in policing and review of the videos, statements, and other 
materials available, it is my opinion, the lethal force used against 
 was not in 
response to an imminent threat as required by the California Penal Code.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Police officers responding to a suicidal man who was also reported to have chased people with 
a knife can be a dangerous and complicated situation. The objective of modern training for 
police officers responding to these incidents is to provide tools and techniques that minimize 
the danger to the subject, citizens, and officers. Those tools include many of the things 
employed in this situation by the Los Angeles Police Department and the officers involved 
(small team tactics, less lethal tools – 40mm, bean bag shotguns, and TASERS, ballistic door 
panels, CIT-type negotiation techniques, and more). 
 
From 
’s arrival through the ensuing eight-plus minutes leading up to the 
shooting, 
 and the officers were employing many of the techniques and tools 
designed to minimize the level of danger to all the parties involved38. The group of officers had 
a modest level of containment and many options in place if 
 were to become violent 
toward others.  The officers had a variety of less-lethal options (OC Spray, Batons, TASERs, 
40mm, Beanbag Shotgun) and were properly using other tools available (ballistic door panels, 
PA System, hand-held shield). 
 
The group of officers was working through the situation under the direction of 
, 
who had clearly defined officer roles and responsibilities and was controlling the police 
response.  It did not appear that 
’s movements were significant enough for Officers Zavala 
and Quintanilla to respond with lethal force when 
 had ordered less lethal force 
to be deployed.  In addition, due to the lethal force being fired so close (less than one second) 
to the less lethal force, there was no opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the less lethal 
force ordered by 
.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 BWC 4:18 – 13:09 
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