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737 - BR11_POST2311373_Quintanilla Julio_Attachment J - SME Report_Redacted.pdf
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About: Julio Quintanilla (case)
Page 14 · file page 709
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Expert Report: Robert Handy
LAPD OIS on 12-18-2021
Involving Officers Zavala and Quintanilla
14
Based on the material reviewed,
’s turn toward Officer Zavala initiated the lethal response
by Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. However,
, upon turning and facing officers Zavala and
Quintanilla, did not pose an imminent threat to them. The situation had not changed
dramatically; the four steps
took were more toward Officers
and Meraz than toward
Officers Zavala and Quintanilla. The lethal force was deployed before any assessment of the
40mm round ordered by
.
Based on my extensive experience in policing and review of the videos, statements, and other
materials available, it is my opinion, the lethal force used against
was not in
response to an imminent threat as required by the California Penal Code.
Conclusion
Police officers responding to a suicidal man who was also reported to have chased people with
a knife can be a dangerous and complicated situation. The objective of modern training for
police officers responding to these incidents is to provide tools and techniques that minimize
the danger to the subject, citizens, and officers. Those tools include many of the things
employed in this situation by the Los Angeles Police Department and the officers involved
(small team tactics, less lethal tools – 40mm, bean bag shotguns, and TASERS, ballistic door
panels, CIT-type negotiation techniques, and more).
From
’s arrival through the ensuing eight-plus minutes leading up to the
shooting,
and the officers were employing many of the techniques and tools
designed to minimize the level of danger to all the parties involved38. The group of officers had
a modest level of containment and many options in place if
were to become violent
toward others. The officers had a variety of less-lethal options (OC Spray, Batons, TASERs,
40mm, Beanbag Shotgun) and were properly using other tools available (ballistic door panels,
PA System, hand-held shield).
The group of officers was working through the situation under the direction of
,
who had clearly defined officer roles and responsibilities and was controlling the police
response. It did not appear that
’s movements were significant enough for Officers Zavala
and Quintanilla to respond with lethal force when
had ordered less lethal force
to be deployed. In addition, due to the lethal force being fired so close (less than one second)
to the less lethal force, there was no opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of the less lethal
force ordered by
.
38
BWC 4:18 – 13:09
Victim
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Sergeant
Victim
Sergeant
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Victim
Sergeant
Victim
Sergeant
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Sergeant
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