737 - BR05_POST2311373_Quintanilla Julio_Attachment D - COP IntradeptMemo_Redacted.pdf
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About: Julio Quintanilla (case)
The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners
Page 11
3.2
monitoring of Officer Zavala, and obtained his PSS. Sergeant Scallon monitored Officers O-1, O-2 and O-3. Sergeant J. Lee, Serial No. 38328, 77th Street Patrol Division, monitored Officers O-4 and Meraz. The overall actions of Sergeants Gaxiola, Cruz, Castellanos, Scallon, and Lee were consistent with Department training and my expectations of supervisors during a critical incident.
As it pertains to Sergeant the UOFRB Minority was critical of his overall command and control. The Minority noted that while he gave orders in a manner that may have indirectly implied he was the IC, he did not declare himself as such. The Minority also noted that Sergeant involved himself in the efforts to communicate with Victim. As Sergeant was the only supervisor at the scene, the minority opined that he should have delegated this role to a subordinate, allowing Sergeant to maintain oversight of the incident and ensure everyone was aware of the potential plan of action. The Minority also opined that Sergeant should have directed an officer to retrieve the ballistic shield instead of doing it himself.
The Minority noted that Sergeant did not request assistance from other supervisors and did not use available resources, such as the Mental Evaluation Unit or the Crisis Negotiation Team. Additionally, the Minority opined that he confused officers by taking on the role of negotiator and formulating a deficient plan to take the suspect into custody. Although Sergeant's direction to use the 40 mm LLL may have been reasonable, the minority opined his plan was deficient because he did not communicate it or his intent to the officers, nor did he direct them to place themselves in a position that would have created a sufficient amount of distance and cover.
The Minority was also critical of Sergeant's decision not to provide a less-lethal warning. The Minority noted that Sergeant stated he did not recall if he issued a use of force warning; however, he also articulated a plan to deploy less-lethal munitions and use the element of surprise to take the suspect into custody. The Minority also noted that Sergeant stated he had time on his side, but opined that his actions of using the element of surprise contradicted this statement. The Minority also opined that yelling "40-millimeter standby" confused Officer 1 as to whether a use of force warning had been given. The UOFRB minority determined that the tactics employed by Sergeant were a substantial deviation, without justification, from Department-approved tactical training.
The UOFRB Majority noted that Sergeant took the initiative to respond to the ambulance attempt suicide call when he recognized the need for a supervisor. Arriving at the scene, Sergeant attempted to de-escalate the situation and convince Victim to drop the knife. As additional units arrived, Sergeant implemented command and control by designating roles and developing a tactical plan using the available resources. While he did not declare himself as the IC before the OIS, he was the only supervisor at the scene and there was no confusion as to his being in command of the incident. Recognizing the need for additional resources, Sergeant obtained a ballistic shield from the trunk of his police vehicle and requested units for traffic control. The Majority opined that Sergeant continuously assessed the situation and made necessary adjustments. Sergeant also ensured that his officers maintained their distance and used cover while attempting to obtain Victim's surrender.
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