736 - BR05_POST2311370_Zavala Jose_Attachment D - COP IntradeptMemo_Redacted.pdf
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About: Jose Zavala (case)
The Honorable Board of Police Commissioners
Page 7
3.2
Victim and that each team had a lethal and less-lethal officer assigned. Sergeant later directed Officer 3 to reposition his police vehicle to the southeast corner to block pedestrian and vehicle traffic. Furthermore, Sergeant directed Officer 2 to reposition his police vehicle between his and Officer Zavala's police vehicle to provide better containment of the scene.
Other Resources – Sergeant assessed the need for less-lethal options and directed the deployment of a 40mm LLL and a Beanbag Shotgun officer. Sergeant assessed his resources and requested additional units to respond to control vehicle and pedestrian traffic. He retrieved a ballistic shield from his police vehicle and assigned it to an arrest team member. Officer Zavala requested an RA unit to respond and to stage near the radio call location before the OIS.
Lines of Communication – Sergeant was the first unit to arrive and repeatedly asked Victim to drop the knife. Shortly after arriving at the scene, Officer Zavala requested backup units for a man with a knife, providing his location and Victim's description. Sergeant assessed his resources and requested additional units to respond to control vehicle and pedestrian traffic. After Victim failed to comply, Officers Zavala, Quintanilla, and Sergeant alternated communicating with him in English and Spanish, using a PA system to enhance communication and Victim's first name to build rapport. Before and after the OIS, Sergeant communicated his plan and their assignments to the officers at the scene.
During the review of the incident, the following Debriefing Topics were noted:
Debriefing Point No. 1
Code Six
When a unit is conducting a field investigation and no assistance is anticipated, a "Code Six," followed by the location, shall be broadcast. A unit shall not go "Code Six" until it arrives at the scene of a call (Los Angeles Police Department Manual, Volume 4, Section 120.40).
Due to an unrelated backup request in the division, Sergeant did not advise CD that he was Code Six when he arrived at the scene. Sergeant broadcast his Code Six status immediately after the unrelated backup request was declared a Code Four, indicating that no further assistance was needed.
The UOFRB evaluated Sergeant's decision to delay broadcasting his Code Six status. The Board noted that as Sergeant was responding to the ambulance attempt suicide radio call, the unrelated backup request was broadcast by officers who were Code Six on armed robbery suspects. Sergeant was aware that multiple units were responding to the backup request and did not want to "tie up the air." To keep the frequency clear for those officers, Sergeant did not advise CD that he had arrived at the scene until the officers broadcast a Code Four.
The UOFRB Majority noted that Sergeant advised CD that he was responding to the ambulance attempt suicide radio call. The Majority also noted that Sergeant was aware
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